

The Individualism Index and the Masculinity Index are based on the two main factors that explain the country differences in HERMES employees' answers to the 14 work goals questions.⁷ A factor analysis showed that almost one-half of the variance in country mean scores on the two questions could be accounted for by just two factors. The Individualism Index is based on the first of these factors, which accounts for 24 percent of the variance in the country mean "work goals" scores. It is mainly composed of the following six work goals:

Loading	Work goal
.86	personal time
.49	freedom
.46	challenge
-.63	use of skills
-.69	physical conditions
-.82	training

The "loading" represents the correlation coefficient across the 40 countries between the factor score and the country mean score for each work goal. Thus, the Individualism Index is strongly related to the mean importance attached in a country to "personal time" ("have a job which leaves you sufficient time for your personal or family life") and sharply *negatively* related to "training" ("have training opportunities—to improve your skills or learn new skills").

Psychologists, and especially American psychologists, have done a considerable amount of research using "work goals" questions (Hofstede, 1976b). Since the publication of a seminal book by Herzberg et al. (1959), it is customary to divide such goals into "intrinsic" (work-related) and "extrinsic" (non-work-related). The factor which we found (empirically) in the country mean work goals scores opposes three goals with positive loadings (personal time, freedom, and challenge) to three goals with negative loadings (use of skills, physical conditions, and training). This is *not* a split according to the intrinsic-extrinsic distinction; Herzberg et al. probably would have classified "freedom," "challenge," "use of skills," and "training" as intrinsic job aspects; "personal time" and "physical conditions" as extrinsic. The factor does *not* oppose the intrinsics to the extrinsics. What the three goals with positive loadings have in common is that they stress the actor's independence from the organization. Even "challenge" ("have challenging work to do—work from which you can get a personal sense of accomplishment"), although it takes place within the organization, stresses the individual's *personal* accomplishment. The three goals with negative loadings rather stress things the organization should do for the individual: provide him or her with training, with working conditions, allow him or her to use his or her skills. The latter goals reflect a more "local" mentality, whereas the former goals reflect a more "cosmopolitan" mentality.

The distinction between "challenge" and "use of skills" may look trivial to a western-educated reader. In fact, across *individuals* within each country and occupational group the importance of "challenge" and "use of skills" are always highly correlated (Hofstede et al., 1976: 29). Yet, this distinction discriminates sharply between national cultures; "challenge" (with its stress on a "personal sense of accomplishment") appeals more in one kind of culture and "use of skills" (with no mention of accomplishment) appeals more in others.

The opposing of goals stressing independence from the organization to goals not stressing independence has been the argument for calling this factor "individual-collective" and using the country factor scores as the basis for a country Individualism Index. The index, by a simple mathematical transformation, has been brought in a range between zero and 100: Its values for the 40 countries are listed in the first column of Figure 5.2.⁸

The highest Individualism Index (IDV) values are found for the United States (91), Australia (90), and Great Britain (89); the lowest for Venezuela (12), Colombia (13), and Pakistan (14). This suggests immediately a correlation of IDV with the Power Distance Index, which also tends to place these countries on opposite sides of the scale. The relationship between PDI and IDV is shown graphically in Figure 5.3.

The PDI-IDV plot shows that there is a broad overall correlation between the two dimensions. Its value is $r = -.67$. In Chapter 2, in the factor analysis of all HERMES value questions, PDI and IDV showed up (with opposite signs) on the same factor. In this book I have nevertheless dealt with power distance and individualism separately for the following reasons:

- (1) They are conceptually different. Power distance refers to emotional dependence on more powerful people; individualism to emotional (in)dependence on groups, organizations, or other collectivities.
- (2) Although most high PDI countries are also low IDV countries and vice versa, this is not always the case. The Latin European countries (and in particular France and Belgium) combine large power distances with high individualism; Austria and Israel combine small power distances with only medium individualism. Collapsing PDI and IDV into one dimension would obscure the unique value patterns of these country clusters.

People in HERMES subsidiaries in the Latin European cluster (to which also South Africa marginally belongs) have a need for strict authority of hierarchical superiors, but *at the same time* stress their personal independence from any collectivity: They are dependent individualists. This culture pattern of dependent individualism has been recognized in the case of France by, for example, Crozier. In *The Bureaucratic Phenomenon*, he writes:

Face-to-face dependence relationships are . . . perceived as difficult to bear in the French cultural setting. Yet the prevailing view of authority is still that of universalism and absolutism. . . . The two attitudes are contradictory. However, they can be reconciled within a bureaucratic system since impersonal rules and centralization make it possible to reconcile an absolutist conception of authority and the elimination of most direct dependence relationships [Crozier 1964: 222].

The opposite pattern (no strict authority but relative personal dependence on the collectivity) as found in Austria and Israel could be called "independent collectivism." An Austrian psychologist interprets this as follows:

The political structure of this country is based on a more primitive organization of society, in which the family model is more clearly present than, for example, in France, where political superstructures prevail. . . . At the same time, our society is sufficiently advanced not to be threatened by this family model in personal relationships. The easy-going relationship between superiors and individuals in private and public organiza-

FIGURE 5.2 Country Individualism Index (IDV) Values Based on the Factor Scores of the First Factor Found in a 14-Work Goals, 40-Country Matrix

Country	IDV		Country	IDV	
	actual	predicted		actual	predicted
U.S.A.	91	95	Argentina	46	47
Australia	90	62	Iran	41	34
Great Britain	89	74	Brazil	38	37
Canada	80	80	Turkey	37	35
Netherlands	80	71	Greece	35	41
New Zealand	79	58	Philippines	32	23
Italy	76	62	Mexico	30	33
Belgium	75	71	Portugal	27	42
Denmark	74	75	Hong Kong	25	29
Sweden	71	85	Chile	23	38
France	71	80	Singapore	20	15
Ireland	70	52	Thailand	20	19
Norway	69	73	Taiwan	17	27
Switzerland	68	73	Peru	16	22
Germany (F.R.)	67	81	Pakistan	14	22
South Africa	65	38	Colombia	13	18
Finland	63	68	Venezuela	12	28
Austria	55	61			
Israel	54	47	Mean of 39 countries	51	50
Spain	51	51	(HERMES)		
India	48	34	Yugoslavia (same		
Japan	46	60	industry)	27	44

Work goal scores were computed for a stratified sample of seven occupations at two points in time. Actual values and values predicted on the basis of multiple regression on wealth, latitude, and organization size.

tions is interpreted by the German as "Austrian charm." Yet I believe that this friendly relationship pattern applies only to face-to-face relationships, such as personally known superiors [Traugott Lindner, personal communication, my translation].

Individualism and Occupation, Sex, and Age

The IDV values were based on the result of a factor analysis of work goals across countries. I have also performed a factor analysis of mean work goal scores across 38 occupations, holding country constant. In this occupational factor analysis there is no trace of an individual-collective dimension: We cannot label one occupation as more "individualist" than another. Instead, for occupations we do find a factor which corresponds fairly well to the "intrinsic-extrinsic" dichotomy according to Herzberg. This factor opposes freedom and challenge on the "intrinsic" side to benefits, physical conditions, and personal time on the "extrinsic" side.

The sex differences in work goals will be shown to be closely related to the issue of "masculinity" in value systems and will therefore be treated in Chapter 6. In that chapter it will be shown that we cannot speak of "Individualism" as being systematically better linked to the male or to the female role.




FIGURE 5.3 Position of the 40 Countries on the Power Distance and Individualism Scales

Age differences in work goals obviously are associated with generation differences; they will be discussed, together with other trend data on values, in Chapter 8.

Country Individualism Index Scores and Other HERMES Survey Questions

The statistical analysis indicates that, first, the country Individualism Index IDV is correlated $r = .64$ with the mean raw Work Goal Importance scores across all 14 goals ("IMP"). A low value of IMP means that respondents in the country tend to score all goals—regardless of content—as "more important." I consider this as a measure of "acquiescence"; that is, the tendency to say "yes" to whatever question. Within countries, we found that acquiescence depends strongly on occupation: lower educated occupations show more acquiescence than higher educated ones (Figure 2.4). I attributed this both to a desire to please the author of the questionnaire (a yielding to the perceived "demand characteristics" of the questions) and to a less differentiated cognitive map among the respondents (see Chapter 2). We now find that the strong acquiescence which is found in less educated occupations (holding country constant) is also found in more collectivist, less individualist countries (hold-

ing occupation constant). The respondent in a more collectivist culture is more sensitive to the social pressure he or she perceives to be emanating from the questionnaire.⁹ We also find a correlation between the Individualism Index and the mean number of years of formal education in a country, keeping occupation constant. In less individualist (poorer) countries, HERMES employees on the average have gone to school longer for a particular occupation (but the education probably has been less practical).

In addition, respondents in more individualist countries, compared with those in more collectivist countries, tend to endorse significantly more frequently the following items in the questionnaire:

- (1) Staying with one company is *not* desirable (B59), and the better managers in a company are *not* those that have been in the company the longest time (C11).
- (2) A larger corporation is generally *not* a more desirable place to work than a small company (C17), and respondents are also less happy about the fact that HERMES is a foreign company (B24).
- (3) A corporation is *not* responsible for its employees (B52).
- (4) Interesting work is *not* as important as earnings (B53).¹⁰
- (5) For getting ahead in industry, knowing influential people is usually more important than ability (C15).
- (6) Decisions made by individuals are usually of higher quality than decisions made by groups (B57).
- (7) In the first survey round (1967-1970), the HERMES questionnaire included 22 rather than 14 work goals. Two of the goals discontinued in 1971 were particularly characteristic of the "collectivist" side of the individual-collective dimension: the importance of working in a successful company (C4) and in a modern company (C5).

Points 1, 2, 3, and 7 confirm the lesser dependency of the individual on the company in more individualist cultures. Point 4 suggests that on the more individualist side, respondents defend more a calculative involvement with the organization, according to Etzioni's terminology. The skeptical attitude about careers in point 5 confirms this calculative, rather than moral, involvement. Point 6, finally, is not surprising: Individual decisions are more ideologically appealing in more individualist cultures.

COMPARING THE HERMES INDIVIDUALISM INDEX VALUES WITH OTHER DATA

Sample Survey Studies

(1) *Managers at IMEDE answering HERMES questions* (see this item in Chapters 2 and 3). Three hundred and sixty-two managers in courses at IMEDE scored the 14 work goals questions in their English version. The statistical analysis shows that across 15 countries, in spite of (1) the small and poorly matched IMEDE samples, (2) the fact that the respondents at IMEDE were all managers whereas those in HERMES were mostly rank-and-file, and (3) the fact that at IMEDE all people answered in English, in HERMES in their native tongue, we do find significant agreement between the two surveys on the following points:

Individualism

- (a) The acquiescence pattern (the tendency to rate *all* goals as more important: rank correlation coefficient $\rho = .62$);
- (b) the presence of the same two factors in the IMEDE data as we found in the HERMES data: an individual-collective and an ego-social factor;
- (c) the scores of the 15 countries on the IMEDE individual-collective factor agree with those on the HERMES Individualism dimension ($\rho = .64$); and
- (d) for five out of the 14 goals separately, countries at IMEDE rank themselves significantly like countries at HERMES: for 12 out of the 14 goals, the rank orders of countries at IMEDE are positively correlated with those at HERMES.

(2) *Managers at IMEDE answering Gordon's Surveys of Personal and Interpersonal Values*. In Chapter 3 we saw how IMEDE participants also supplied scores on L. V. Gordon's Surveys of Personal and Interpersonal Values and how these scores were subjected to an ecological factor analysis. One of the three factors found, "Conformity versus variety," is weakly negatively correlated with IDV ($r = -.42$), in the sense that IMEDE managers from more individualist countries tend to stress leadership and variety, while those from less individualist countries tend to stress conformity and orderliness.

(3) *Samples of managers in 19 countries answering Haire et al.'s "attitudes and assumptions underlying management practices."* The classical "comparative management" study by Haire et al. (1966) has already been quoted several times in this book. One part of this 14-country study dealt with "attitudes and assumptions underlying management practices"; it consisted of eight items which are listed in Chapter 3. I have expressed my methodological misgivings about combining the items into subscales at face value; in addition, the choice of the items reflects strongly the American frame of mind of the authors, and their formulation is not always foolproof. Yet, across 19 countries (14 from the original study plus five from replications by Clark and McCabe, 1970, and Redding and Casey, 1976), two subscales correlate significantly with IDV. The highest correlating subscale is "Sharing information and objectives" ($r = .63$).

In more individualist countries, managers tend to *disagree* with the statements that a good leader should give detailed instructions and only information necessary for their immediate tasks.

The other subscale significantly correlating with IDV ($r = .48$) is "participation." In more individualist countries, managers tend to agree with the statements that if subordinates cannot influence them, they as managers lose some influence; and that group goal-setting offers advantages.

In both cases, the subscales correlate more with IDV than with PDI; they seem to be less associated with the immediate power relationships people are in, but more with the country's general level of modernity (IDV being closely associated with economic development).

(4) *Samples of managers in 14¹¹ countries answering to Haire et al.'s "managerial motivations and satisfactions" questions.* This is another part of the survey referred to in the previous section. This part can also be criticized on methodological grounds, for a "reverse ecological fallacy" (see Chapter 1) and for ethnocentrism. The authors combined the country scores on 11 "need importance" items (which 1

would call "work goals") into five categories based on the theory of Maslow, without statistical proof (through ecological correlations) that this combining was justified. Haire et al.'s published scores for 14 countries and five "need categories" show the following significant similarities with the HERMES results:

- (a) The acquiescence (the tendency to rate everything as more or less important) in Haire et al.'s country data correlates with the HERMES acquiescence scores ("IMP") with $\rho = .59$, and also with the HERMES Individualism Index scores (IDV) with $\rho = -.59$, (more individualist countries less acquiescence).
- (b) In countries which the HERMES data show to be more individualist (higher IDV), Haire et al. find a stronger need for autonomy and a weaker need for security ($r = .60$ in both cases).

(5) *Samples of managers from 12 countries doing the exercise "Life Goals" (one of the exercises distributed by IRGOM).* This exercise asks respondents to rank 11 goals in order of importance; they are not strictly work goals but cover a somewhat broader area. The 11 goals are labeled self-realization, leadership, expertise, wealth, independence, prestige, affection, service, duty, security, and pleasure. Using data for 3082 managers from 12 countries (Bass and Burger, 1979), I performed an ecological factor analysis. There are two strong factors, of which one (labeled by me "hedonism-skill") is strongly correlated ($\rho = .76$) with the Individualism Index, and the other (labeled by me "assertiveness-service") is strongly correlated ($\rho = .84$) with the Masculinity Index. This means that the two main factors found in the IRGOM Life Goals are virtually identical to the two main factors found in HERMES work goals. This occurred in spite of the differences in samples (managers from a variety of organizations versus employees of one company), the different data collection periods (the IRGOM data were collected between 1978 and 1976), the different data collection setting (training versus employee survey), the different questions used, and the different methods of scoring (ranking versus rating).

The convergence between the factors in the two studies means that individualism (personal time, freedom, challenge) is associated also with hedonism (pleasure, security, affection); collectivism (training, physical conditions, use of skills) also with skill (expertise, prestige, duty). The social or feminine value cluster which we shall further explore in Chapter 6 (manager, cooperation, desirable area, employment security) is associated also with service; the ego or masculine value cluster (earnings, recognition, advancement, challenge, use of skills) also with assertiveness (leadership, independence, self-realization).

(6) *Samples of students from six countries answering Bass and Franke's (1972) "Organizational Success Questionnaire."* This study in its original form can be criticized for a "reverse ecological fallacy." The 12 items in the questionnaire were grouped into a "social" and a "political" index based upon correlations found across U.S. individuals, whereas the ecological correlations pointed to a quite different clustering of items on the basis of country means.

The statistical analysis shows that on the basis of country means we find three dimensions, of which one, "openness vs. secrecy," is significantly negatively correlated with the Individualism Index ($r = .91$). This means that in more individualist countries, students confronted with Bass and Franke's items are more inclined to score themselves as "withholding information" and less inclined to score "sharing in decision making," "openly committing themselves," and "making political alliances."

It does *not* mean, of course, that when put in the situation they would actually *show* these behaviors (they may or they may not), but it does illustrate the different social desirability of these behaviors in the different cultures. In more individualist countries, students describe themselves more easily as *going their own way without mind-ing others*.

(7) *Samples of male students from six countries answering Morris' (1956) "Ways to Live" questionnaire.* Morris' 13 "Ways to Live" are terminal values: fundamental attitudes toward life, each of which is described in a fairly lengthy paragraph. The respondents are required to score on a seven-point scale how much they would like or dislike living according to each of the 13 ways. In an ecological reanalysis of Morris' published data, I found two main dimensions, which are described in Hofstede (1980b: 253): I labeled them "enjoyment versus duty" and "engagement versus withdrawal." It appears that the first factor is significantly ($r = .73$) correlated with the Individualism Index. In more individualist countries, students prefer the "enjoyment" ways to live; in less individualist countries, they tend toward the "duty" side. The second dimension is dominated by a high score of the Chinese on "obeying the cosmic purposes,"¹² and has no significant correlations with HERMES indices.

The presence in these seven very different sample survey studies of dimensions correlated with the Individualism Index shows the pervasiveness of individualism as a dimension of culture. The last two cases demonstrate that even with only six countries, it makes sense to use ecological factor analysis to reduce the data to meaningful dimensions.

Other Multicountry Studies

(1) *McClelland's need for Affiliation (n_{Aff}).* We met McClelland's study in Chapter 4. Besides the relationships of HERMES data with n_{Ach} , there is a significant correlation ($\rho = .46$ across 22 countries) between the Individualism Index and the scores for n_{Aff} based on 1925 children's readers (we find again that it is McClelland's 1925, not his 1950, data which correlate with a HERMES index; which speaks in favor of the greater reliability of the 1925 data). The implication of the correlation is that in the more individualist countries, there is more of a stress on affiliation in the stories. McClelland defines affiliation as "establishing, maintaining, or restoring a positive affective relationship with another person. This relationship is most adequately described by the word friendship" (1961: 160). Thus, in less individualist countries where traditional social ties, like those with extended family members, continue to exist, people have less of a need to make specific friendships. One's friends are predetermined by the social relationships into which one is born. In the more individualist countries, however, affective relationships are not socially predetermined, but must be acquired by each individual personally. Thus, making friendships becomes more of an issue for the individual.

(2) *Traffic deaths.* There is a quite significant ($\rho = -.61$) negative correlation between individualism and traffic deaths (across 14 European countries; compare Chapter 4). In the more individualist countries, traffic is safer. These countries tend to be wealthier, which is likely to increase the numbers of vehicles available and to decrease the number of kilometers per vehicle; also, roads are probably better adapted to heavier traffic in the wealthier countries. Nevertheless, the Spearman rank

correlation between wealth (GNP/capita) and traffic deaths is only $-.51$, so there is more to the correlation between IDV and traffic safety than just greater wealth. If we expand Etzioni's distinction between a "calculative" and a "moral" involvement to the traffic situation, it is likely that drivers in more individualist countries show a more calculative involvement in traffic, and that this leads to safer driving.

(3) *Time use.* Converse (1972) summarizes the findings of a 12-country comparative study of their citizens' time use. Using both multi-dimensional scaling and smallest space analysis, he finds that the major differences in overall time use among the countries separate themselves into two dimensions, which he calls "North-South" and "East-West" (1972: 151). Because this study includes six East European countries not in the HERMES sample, I can only compare it with HERMES data across six countries: Belgium, France, Germany, Peru, U.S.A., and Yugoslavia.

Across these six countries, Converse's North-South dimension rank correlates 1.00 with the HERMES Individualism Index (significant at the .01 level). The "North" countries spend more time watching TV, shopping, as members in voluntary organizations, in personal care, in religious activities, and reading papers. This corresponds with high Individualism Index scores. The "South" countries spend more time resting, cooking, tending animals, gardening, being outdoors, sleeping, and eating. This corresponds with low Individualism Index scores. It obviously reflects the "modernity" of the society.¹³

Differences in Individualism Found in Two-Country Studies

Preiss (1971) compared HERMES work goal data to data of American and German engineers. His results strongly support the greater individualism in the United States which is also reflected in the HERMES Individualism Index scores (91 for U.S.A., 67 for Germany).

Another "comparative" study of work goals was done by Singh and Wherry (1963) among 200 Indian metal workers; 10 goals were ranked, and the results were compared with those of six studies carried out in the United States between 1932 and 1950. The Indians' goal-ranking resembled more that of the Americans in the thirties than in the fifties. The United States became considerably wealthier in this period; if the goals of Indians resemble more the goals of Americans when they were poorer, this supports the relationships between goal pattern and wealth.

In chapter 3 I referred to a study by Williams et al. (1966) among workers in Peru and the United States. They established a relationship between a high Power Distance Index value and low "faith in people" or interpersonal trust. High PDI tends to be associated with low individualism, but it seems paradoxical that low individualism should be associated with low interpersonal trust, and vice versa (Peru scores 16 on IDV and the United States 91). Williams et al. (1966: 117) suggest on this issue that we should distinguish between individualism as the taking of individual initiative and individualism as the nonidentification with a group. The Individualism Index measures the taking of individual initiative. Identification or nonidentification with a group is rather related to the distribution of power—that is, to PDI. High PDI leads to low trust in others—that is, to nonidentification with a group. I would add, however, that we should also distinguish between ingroups and outgroups. In low individ-

ualism cultures, the contrast between the two is particularly strong. It is because the Peruvian work groups studied by Williams et al. remained outgroups to the worker that interpersonal trust did not develop. In low individualism cultures one just does not trust a "somebody"—one only trusts "us."

Another comparison between the United States and a Latin American country, this time Mexico, is found in a paper by Zurcher et al. (1965). They administered a questionnaire to 38 Mexican-American, and 149 Anglo-American bank employees near the border between the two countries; the questions were aiming at measuring the endorsement of values of "universalism" (institutionalized obligations to society) versus "particularism" (institutional obligations to friendship). This distinction is one of Parsons and Shils's pattern variables (Chapter 1). They showed Mexicans to be more particularist, Anglo-Americans more universalist. Zurcher et al. (1965: 54) link the Mexican particularism to the maintenance of an extended kinship system. They quote Oscar Lewis: "Without his family, the Mexican individual stands prey to every form of aggression, exploitation and humiliation." This family becomes extended through a large number of compadres, or godparents. Zurcher et al. conclude that individuals in this type of society perceive social situations in terms of close personal bonds, where Americans would perceive them impersonally. Mexico scores 30 on IDV, the United States 91; the association between low IDV and particularism, through the extended kinship system, makes sense.

A Summary of Connotations of the Individualism Index Found in Survey and Related Material

As was done for PDI in Figure 3.6 and for UAI in Figure 4.2, in Figure 5.4 I have integrated the connotations of low and high individualism found so far. The warnings given in Chapter 3 should be remembered when reading this table; countries may be anywhere in between the two extremes pictured; not all connotations apply in all countries; and individuals within countries vary from societal norms.

The data upon which Figure 5.4 is based are mostly from narrow samples in countries; some of them not even very well matched. The samples, however, were at least all *different* ones. The fact that the same individualism dimension shows up in these different samples speaks in favor of the ubiquity of the dimension. It is very likely that a more thorough search of the literature on comparative representative samples studies of entire populations will yield more evidence of an IDV dimension in these studies too; I simply have not got that far.

THE INDIVIDUALISM NORM, ITS ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES

The Relationship Between Individualism and National Wealth

The relationship has been explored of the Individualism Index (IDV) with seven economic, geographic, and demographic indicators which were identified in Chapter 2 and already used in the Chapters 3 and 4. Across all 40 countries, there is a striking .82 correlation between IDV and wealth (1970 GNP per capita). If we take into

FIGURE 5.4 (Continued)

163	More traffic accidents per 1000 vehicles.	Fewer traffic accidents per 1000 vehicles.
164	More traditional time use pattern.	More modern time use pattern.

account the large error margins of IDV (composed from answers of HERMES employees to translated paper-and-pencil questionnaires) and of GNP (World Bank data based on imprecise statistics and shaky exchange rates), this level of correlation is really remarkable: The two measures share $.822 = 68\%$ of their variance! The strong correlation between IDV and GNP per capita is illustrated in the graph of Figure 5.5.

Countries to the righthand side of the regression line are less individualistic than their 1970 wealth would predict; those to the left are more individualistic.¹⁴ We notice that the three Chinese countries Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan score well to the right side of the regression line: They are less individualistic than their wealth would warrant, which is in agreement with the *jen* philosophy referred to earlier.

The statistical analysis shows that, besides wealth, geographical latitude and HERMES organization size in the country contribute significantly to predicting IDV (colder countries and countries with larger HERMES subsidiaries are more individualist). By using the three predictors of wealth, latitude, and organization size simultaneously, we get an even more accurate prediction of IDV, which has been listed with the actual values in Figure 5.2. Differences of more than 10 points between actual and predicted value of IDV are found for the following:

<i>more individualistic</i>	<i>less individualistic</i>
+28 Australia	-17 Yugoslavia
+27 South Africa	-16 Venezuela
+21 New Zealand	-15 Chile
+18 Ireland	-15 Portugal
+15 Great Britain	-14 Sweden
+14 India	-14 Japan
+14 Italy	-14 Germany

These differences represent the variance in Individualism Index scores not related to wealth, latitude, or the size of the HERMES subsidiary, but, for example, to historical or traditional factors. The positive score for South Africa is partly due to the IDV score being based on the answers of white respondents only, while the GNP per capita refers to the total population. However, we do find at the "more individualistic" side a "British Culture" cluster in which only Canada and the United States are conspicuously absent.

One particularity which distinguishes these countries from others is an exceedingly atomized trade union system (especially in Great Britain, which has been the model for the other British-culture countries) with craft unions that compete with each other and find it very difficult to undertake integrated action; we can see this as an outcome of an exceedingly individualistic value system. Worker self-management is not a popular theme in these countries.

FIGURE 5.4 Summary of Connotations of Individualism Index Differences Found in Survey and Related Research

See page	Low IDV Countries	High IDV Countries
156	Importance of provisions by company (training, physical conditions).	Importance of employees' personal life (time).
160	Emotional dependence on company.	Emotional independence from company.
160	Large company attractive.	Small company attractive.
160	Moral involvement with company.	Calculative involvement with company.
156	More importance attached to training and use of skills in jobs.	More importance attached to freedom and challenge in jobs.
163	Students consider it less socially acceptable to claim pursuing their own ends without minding others.	Students consider it socially acceptable to claim pursuing their own ends without minding others.
161	Managers aspire to conformity and orderliness.	Managers aspire to leadership and variety.
162	Managers rate having security in their position more important.	Managers rate having autonomy more important.
161	Managers endorse "traditional" points of view, not supporting employee initiative and group activity.	Managers endorse "modern" points of view on stimulating employee initiative and group activity.
160	Group decisions are considered better than individual decisions.	However, individual decisions are considered better than group decisions.
163	Duty in life appeals to students.	Enjoyment in life appeals to students.
162	Managers choose duty, expertness, and prestige as life goals.	Managers choose pleasure, affection, and security as life goals.
164	Individual initiative is socially frowned upon; fatalism.	Individual initiative is socially encouraged.
160	More acquiescence in responses to "importance" questions.	Less acquiescence in responses to "importance" questions.
161		
162		
165	People thought of in terms of ingroups and outgroups; particularism.	People thought of in general terms; universalism.
164	Social relations predetermined in terms of ingroups.	Need to make specific friendships.
160	More years of schooling needed to do a given job.	Fewer years of schooling needed to do a given job.




FIGURE 5.5 Position of the 40 Countries on Their Individualism Index (IDV) Versus Their 1970 National Wealth

On the "less individualistic" side we find Yugoslavia with its worker self-management system; Chile and Portugal, in which forms of worker self-management were tried in the recent past; Sweden, which is known for its keen interest in worker participation; and Japan and Germany, which both carry the image of countries in which collective efforts are popular. These show that the residual variance in IDV does relate to differences in the work organization tendencies among countries which cannot be explained by differences in wealth.

For the 19 wealthy countries, 1960-1970 economic growth is *negatively* related to individualism. This fact (wealth is positively associated with individualism, but lower individualism with faster growth of wealth) logically should lead to a certain balancing of wealth among wealthy countries: If they become too wealthy they become too individualist to grow any more. This, of course, assumes a causality which the data do not prove; and over time, other factors may enter. But the theory of a balancing of wealth among wealthy countries has a certain plausibility.

Individualism and Political Systems

Béteille (1977: 162ff) stresses the correspondence, both historical and geographical, among political democracy, capitalism, competition, and individualism. The capitalist market economy fosters individualism and in turn depends on it. On the other hand, various socialist types of economic order foster collectivism and in turn depend on it, although to various degrees.

In Chapter 3 I related power distance to the difference between "balanced power" and "unbalanced power" in political systems. Seventeen countries in the upper half of the Power Distance Index range show unbalanced power, 17 in the lower half show balanced power since 1950, and there are three exceptions on either side (France, Belgium, and Turkey high PDI and balanced power; Argentina, South Africa, and Pakistan lower PDI and unbalanced power). If we make a similar 2×2 table for IDV, we find that it is even closer associated with balanced power: 18 countries in the upper half of the IDV-range have balanced power and vice-versa; the two exceptions on either side are Turkey and Japan (balanced power but lower IDV; both are marginal cases as the balance of power in Turkey is precarious and Japan is just in the lower half of the IDV range) versus South Africa and Spain (unbalanced power but higher IDV).

I used the power distance explanation of balanced versus unbalanced political power in Chapter 3 because it makes conceptual sense to relate power to power. Why does individualism predict balanced political power even more accurately? The key to this question must be in the two exceptional countries, Belgium and France, which show high PDI and high IDV (Figure 5.3) and balanced political power. If these two countries, in spite of strong authoritarian elements in their national value systems, have continued to respect certain rules of political pluralism, it is certainly because of their individualism: A dictator in these countries simply cannot obtain sufficient passive compliance to survive. The universalist norm which we found associated with individualism also resists a regime based entirely on particularism (although there is a lot of de facto particularism in these countries).

We saw in Chapter 3 that GNP per capita per se is an almost perfect predictor of balanced political power: 19 countries in the upper range of GNP show balanced power and vice versa, and there is only one exception on either side—Turkey versus Argentina, both in some way marginal cases. If GNP predicts the balance in the political system in the period we are considering (since 1950), it must be because it affects political events in other ways than through dominant value systems (Power Distance and Individualism) as well. In Chapter 3 I drew a suggested causal path (Figure 3.8) for PDI in which social mobility and the development of a middle class is the central factor contributing directly to GNP and indirectly to decentralization of political power and questioning of authority in general (PDI). It is likely that individualism, too, is associated with the development of a middle class: Individualist values tend to be middle-class values; individualism is even more closely conceptually related to the development of a middle class than is low power distance.

The development of a middle class presupposes social mobility. In a statistical analysis, we find the correlations of the Individualism Index with two measures of social mobility, one (Cutright, 1968) across 12 countries, the other (Miller, 1960) across 11 countries. Both indicate to what extent sons of fathers in manual occupations have access to nonmanual occupations, and vice versa. Both correlate with IDV

($\rho = -.71$ and $-.50$); the correlation indicates greater social mobility for more individualist countries.

Individualism and balanced political power—that is, political stability—can be related in still another way: through the distribution of the national wealth across sectors of the economy (such as, between farming and manufacturing workers). Sectoral equality or inequality is something other than equality or inequality of individual incomes; the latter in Chapter 3 was shown to be associated with PDI. In a statistical analysis, we find significant correlations among the Individualism Index and two measures of sectoral inequality, from Cutright (1967) and from Taylor and Hudson (1972), in both cases across 33 countries ($r = -.60$ and $-.71$); they indicate greater sectoral equality in more individualist countries. I interpret this as the outcome of a universalist attitude among both decision makers and population; but it will definitely increase political stability; as underprivileged economic sectors are a threat to the stability of any regime. In his article, Cutright shows for 44 countries a relationship between equality of sectors of the economy and “political representativeness”; the latter resembles my “balanced power” criterion. He argues that political representativeness decreases inequality because it forces the political elites to respond to the needs of the nonelite classes for a greater share of the national product (1967: 565).

The statistical analysis also shows a correlation across 19 countries between the Individualism Index and an (intersubjective) measure of press freedom (Taylor and Hudson, 1972): $\rho = .51$. It makes sense that greater press freedom is the outcome of a more individualist, universalist value system with a stronger approval of individual initiative. However, per capita GNP per se is an even better predictor of the Press Freedom Index, which suggests that apart from values, there are purely economic reasons which push toward more press freedom in wealthier countries: more newspapers, more interest groups that want their opinions to be known and have the means for it. In chapter 4 I referred to a public opinion study in five countries by Kaase and Marsh (1976) about “protest potential.” The results of the study oppose Austria and Germany (low protest potential, high repression potential) to Great Britain, the Netherlands and the United States (the opposite). I interpreted this as a difference in UAI, but the two groups of countries are also separated on IDV; high protest potential and low repression potential is found in higher IDV, lower UAI countries. This is in agreement with the findings on the value components in press freedom shown above.

The Individualism Norm and Its Origins

In the same way as I did earlier for PDI and UAI, I have in Figure 5.6 composed an integrated picture of the general societal norm behind the “low IDV” and “high IDV” syndromes. It goes back to the summary of survey findings in Figure 5.4 and some of the correlations with country-level indices discussed afterward. Again, we should see the individualism norm as a value system shared especially by the majority in the middle classes in a society.

As far as the origins of national differences in individualism are concerned, according to the diagram in Figure 1.4 we have to look for these in ecological factors. In Figure 5.7 I have listed those we met in the previous pages as being statistically associated with IDV, with some inferences that make the pattern more coherent.

There are similarities between the origins of IDV and the origins of PDI as pictured in the proposed “causal chain” of Figure 3.8. However, for differences in IDV

we have to put economic development first, as it correlates so highly. Climate in this case is a secondary factor, and it is supposed to either support or discourage individual initiative. The nuclear rather than extended family structure is supposed to be a central element in breeding individualism. The smaller population growth means that also, on the high IDV side, parents tend to have fewer children; the child from a small family, other factors being equal, learns to be more individualist than the child from a large family. The longer education for a given job on the low IDV side (discussed earlier in this chapter) suggests a more traditional educational system with more rote learning of revealed truths; also, this educational system will cover a smaller part of the population than the more pragmatic education on the high IDV side. Then, apart from all these systematic characteristics, we should take idiosyncratic historical factors into account.

Consequences of Different Individualism Index Levels

As in the two previous chapters, I have collected in Figure 5.8 the consequences of low and high IDV levels: for society at large; for religion, ideology, and theory; and for organizations. On the low IDV side, this table presents a problem: Some statements apply to all societies studied, which means that “low IDV” stands for “less economically developed.” Others presuppose a certain level of economic develop-

FIGURE 5.6 The Individualism Societal Norm

Low IDV	High IDV
• In society, people are born into extended families or clans which protect them in exchange for loyalty. • “We” consciousness. • Collectivity-orientation.^a • Identity is based in the social system. • Emotional dependence of individual on organizations and institutions. • Emphasis on belonging to organization; membership ideal. • Private life is invaded by organizations and clans to which one belongs; opinions are predetermined. • Expertise, order, duty, security provided by organization or clan. • Friendships predetermined by stable social relationships; but need for prestige within these relationships. • Belief in group decisions. • Value standards differ for ingroups and outgroups; particularism.^a	• In society, everyone is supposed to take care of him or herself and his or her immediate family. • “I” consciousness. • Self-orientation.^a • Identity is based in the individual. • Emotional independence of individual from organizations or institutions. • Emphasis on individual initiative and achievement; leadership ideal. • Everyone has a right on a private life and opinion. • Autonomy, variety, pleasure, individual financial security. • Need for specific friendships. • Belief in individual decisions. • Value standards should apply to all; universalism.^a

^aParsons and Shils (1951).

FIGURE 5.7 Origins of National Individualism Index Differences

Low IDV	High IDV
• Less economic development. • Less social mobility and weak development of middle class. • Tropical and subtropical climates. • Survival less dependent on individual initiative. • More traditional agriculture, less modern industry, less urbanization. • Extended family or tribal structures. • More children per nuclear family. • Traditional educational systems, for minority of population. • Historical factors: tradition of collectivist thinking and action. • Smaller, particularist organizations.	• Greater economic development. • Greater social mobility and strong development of middle class. • Moderate to cold climates. • Survival more dependent on individual initiative. • Less traditional agriculture, more modern industry, more urbanization. • Nuclear family structure. • Fewer children per nuclear family. • Pragmatic educational systems, for majority of population. • Historical factors: tradition of individualist thinking and action. • Larger, universalist organizations.

ment, so that "low IDV" stands for "relatively low IDV given a certain level of economic development." I have nevertheless maintained the two types of statements in one column because they show a certain coherence.

The religious-ideological-political consequences merit further study. Individualism reminds us of the "Protestant Ethic" of Max Weber, but the Catholic/Protestant ratio in wealthy countries is unrelated to individualism (but related to UAI and MAS); we are rather dealing with a "modernist ethic" versus a "traditionalist ethic." The Chinese *jen* philosophy of man described at the beginning of this chapter (Hsu, 1971) is the best formulation of the low IDV sentiment I found so far; the worship of the independent actor in Whyte's (1956) *Organization Man* the best formulation of the high IDV sentiment.

With regard to organizations, in stable low IDV societies, members will transfer part of their extended-family or clan allegiances to the organization they belong to. Japan is the one example of a society that has shaped its utilitarian organizations to cater to people's needs in this respect, although both values and organizations in Japan are shifting fast to the more individualist side. In the history of capitalism, we find many examples of employers who attempted to look after their employees from the cradle to the grave, from Robert Owen in early nineteenth-century Britain to Philips Lamp in the Netherlands and IBM in the United States in the 1930s; the latter even had its company songs, as some Japanese companies still have today. One of the challenges of multinational organizations today is to adapt themselves to the very different levels of individualism of their employees in different parts of the world; in Chapter 9 I shall go deeper into this.

FIGURE 5.8 Consequences of National Individualism Index Differences

See page	Low IDV Countries	High IDV Countries
	<i>Consequences for Society at Large</i>	
151	• <i>Gemeinschaft</i> (community-based) social order.	• <i>Gesellschaft</i> (society-based) social order.
168	• For wealthy countries, a relatively low IDV helps economic growth.	• After a certain level of wealth has been obtained, slower economic growth.
169	• Unbalanced power political systems.	• Balanced power political systems.
169	• Less occupational mobility.	• Greater occupational mobility.
170	• Income inequality between sectors of the economy.	• Income equality between sectors of the economy.
170	• Less press freedom.	• More press freedom.
170	• Repression potential.	• Protest potential.
167	• Labor movement more united.	• Labor movement more atomized.
168	• Labor unions more interested in sharing management responsibility; appeal of worker self-management.	• Labor unions less interested in sharing management responsibility.
163	• More road accidents.	• Safer driving.
	<i>Consequences for Religious Life and Philosophical and Ideological Thinking</i>	
150	• Collective conversions.	• Individual conversions.
150	• <i>Jen</i> philosophy of man.	• Personality philosophy of man.
154	• Stress on identity and roots.	• Worship of the independent actor.
150	• Traditionalist ethic.	• "Protestant" (modernist) ethic.
	<i>Consequences for Organizations</i>	
153	• Involvement of individuals with organizations primarily moral.	• Involvement of individuals with organizations primarily calculative.
160	• Employees expect organizations to look after them like a family—and can become very alienated if organization dissatisfies them.	• Organizations are not expected to look after employees from the cradle to the grave.
151	• Organization has great influence on members' well-being.	• Organization has moderate influence on members' well-being.
160	• Employees expect organization to defend their interests.	• Employees are expected to defend their own interests.
156	• Policies and practices based on loyalty and sense of duty.	• Policies and practices should allow for individual initiative.

FIGURE 5.8 (Continued)

153	• Promotion from inside.	(localism)	• Promotion from inside (cosmo-
160	• Promotion on seniority.		poli-
			Promotion on market tanism)
			value.
161	• Less concern with fashion in management ideas.		• Managers try to be up-to-date and endorse modern management ideas.
152	• Policies and practices vary according to relations		• Policies and practices apply to all (universalism).
164	(particularism).		

NOTES

1. Differences in family structure are reflected in the words available in a language to describe kinship ties.
2. Across 74 less developed nations, Adelman and Morris (1967: 151) show a close relationship between their level of economic development and their "basic social organization": from strong tribal allegiances to extended family to nuclear family.
3. This applies to the twentieth century. For example, at the time of the Reformation (sixteenth century) western countries, too, were collectivistic and were converted collectively.
4. And by the corresponding statistical data of Adelman and Morris; see note 2.
5. Others, such as Sayles (1964), have tried to defend U.S. big business against Whyte's attacks. Sayles is as much in favor of individualism as in Whyte, but he claims that big business fosters individualism rather than the opposite.
6. Martin and Lodge (1975) report on a survey among over 1800 readers of *Harvard Business Review*, on which "ideology" will prevail in the United States in 1985: the traditional individualistic one, or a new communitarian ideology. Of the respondents, 70 percent prefer individualism, but 73 percent expect that communitarianism will prevail in 1985. The survey expresses a fear of collectivism as an alien but inescapable force.
7. After standardization of the raw country mean scores; see Chapter 2.
8. Unlike in the case of PDI and UAI, a theoretical maximum and minimum score for IDV cannot be given. IDV is not based on scores for separate questions but on factor scores; through the factor analysis computation, the factor scores are automatically brought within a range which rarely exceeds ± 2.00 ; this corresponds to an index value range of 0-100.
9. The IMP data show the highest scores, and so the least acquiescence, for Finland (IMP = 2.33). To Professor Osmo Wiio from Finland, who has done extensive survey research, I owe the remark that Finns seem to be a nation of flip-flops; they readily choose extreme answers on survey questions.
10. There is no correlation between the country mean scores for this belief (which is formulated as an ideological statement) and the importance of "earnings" as a personal work goal (A7). We see again the difference between a "value as the desirable" and a "value as the desired."
11. "Need importance" data were collected afterwards with the Haire et al. questionnaire or translations of it by Mozina (1969) in Yugoslavia and by Redding (1977) in eight Southeast Asian countries. I have not used the data from these studies because in Mozina's case I am not sure that the sample matches Haire et al.'s samples. Redding unfortunately only presents his data in graphical form which makes them difficult to read; also, his data were collected through interview rather than by questionnaire.

12. This "way" is defined in the English version of the questionnaire as follows: "A person should let himself be used. Used by other persons in their growth, used by the great objective purposes in the universe which silently and irresistibly achieve their goal. One should be a serene, confident, quiet vessel and instrument of the great dependable powers which move to their fulfillment." This statement, apparently, appealed very much to the Chinese students in 1948.

13. Converse's "East-West" dimension rank correlates .89* with PDI. This is not as easy to interpret; it opposes more book reading, movies, and radio and more time at work and traveling to it in higher PDI countries; more magazine reading, TV watching, social activities, home chores, conversation, and sleep in lower PDI countries. Converse sees in it a work-versus-freetime dimension (1972: 155).

14. The fact that GNP is expressed in dollars leads to predicting higher IDV scores for countries with relatively overvalued currency in 1970 (the United States and Switzerland) and the reverse for countries with undervalued currency (Great Britain and Italy).

Chapter 6

in values between men and women in the same jobs. The MAS index scale is correlated across countries with other questions in the HERMES questionnaire, with an indirect measure of work centrality in HERMES, and with survey data collected outside HERMES. MAS is correlated, together with low uncertainty avoidance, with need for achievement as measured by McClelland in a content analysis of 1925 children's books.

The various correlates of MAS have been assembled into a coherent picture of the "masculine" and "feminine" types of national culture. MAS is significantly negatively correlated with the percentage of women in professional and technical jobs, at least in the wealthier countries, and positively with the segregation of the sexes in higher education. It is also positively correlated both with allowed traffic speeds and with traffic deaths; and in Christian countries with Catholicism rather than with Protestantism. Finally, across wealthy countries it is correlated negatively with the percentage of GNP spent on government aid to third world countries. From all these data, an integrated picture has been developed of the masculinity and femininity societal norms, their likely origins, and their consequences for society at large, for ideology, and for organizations.

SEXES AND SEX ROLES

Absolute, Statistical, and Social Sex Differences

If the duality of life and death is nature's number one law, the duality of female and male, which governs procreation in all higher vegetal and animal species, is number two law and follows very closely. In human societies of all ages and levels of complexity, this nature-given fact has been one of the very first issues with which the society had to cope in its own specific way, and which profoundly affected a multitude of societal institutions: "The sex-role system is at the core of our cultural norms" (Chetwynd and Hartnett, 1978:3).

The only difference between women and men which is absolute is that women bear children and men beget them. The biological differences between the sexes not immediately related to their roles in procreation are statistical rather than absolute: men are *on the average* taller and stronger (but many women are taller and/or stronger than many men), women have *on the average* greater finger dexterity and for example, faster metabolism which makes them recover faster from fatigue. These absolute and statistical biological differences are the same for all human societies; but these differences leave a wide margin for the actual division of roles in most activities between women and men. In a strict sense, only behaviors directly connected with procreation (childbearing and child-begetting) are "feminine" or "masculine." Yet, every society recognizes many other behaviors as more suitable to females or more suitable to males; however, these represent relatively arbitrary choices, mediated by cultural norms and traditions.

Of course, there is a common trend among the vast majority of societies, both traditional and modern, as to the distribution of sex roles apart from procreation: men must be more concerned with economic and other achievements and women must be more concerned with taking care of people in general and children in particular. It is not difficult to see how this role pattern fits with the biological sex roles:

MASCULINITY

SUMMARY OF THIS CHAPTER

The fourth dimension along which national cultures can be shown to differ systematically has been called Masculinity, with its opposite pole Femininity. The duality of the sexes is a fundamental fact with which different societies cope in different ways; the issue is whether the biological differences between the sexes should or should not have implications for their roles in social activities. The sex role distribution common in a particular society is transferred by socialization in families, schools, and peer groups, and through the media. The predominant socialization pattern is for men to be more assertive and for women to be more nurturing. In organizations, there is a relationship between the perceived goals of the organization and the career possibilities for men and women; business organizations have "masculine" goals and tend to promote men; hospitals have more "feminine" goals and, at least on the nursing side, tend to promote women.

A review of survey data on the importance of work goals shows near consistency on men scoring advancement and earnings as more important, women interpersonal aspects, rendering service, and the physical environment as more important. The same kind of differences were found in HERMES data. Differences in work goal importance in HERMES among occupations and among countries contain a component or factor which opposes "masculine" to "feminine" goals. The factor score of the 40 countries on this factor has been used as the basis for a country Masculinity Index (MAS) which measures to what extent HERMES respondents in a country (of both sexes) tend to endorse goals usually more popular among men (high MAS) or among women (low MAS). Countries with higher MAS values also show greater differences